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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyse which measure of ination should betaken as target variable in an open economy framework. In a closed economycontext there is common agreement on price ination stabilization being one ofthe objects of monetary policy. From the ad-hoc interest rate rule proposedby Taylor (1993), to the more recent New Keynesian literature deriving optimalmonetary policy rules from the minimization of loss functions obtained via secondorder approximation of the utility of the representative consumer, the monetaryinstrument has to be chosen in order to match a given ination target (amongwith other targets). However, moving to an open economy context gives riseto the coexistence of two measures of ination: domestic ination (DI) andconsumer price ination (CPI). Which one of the two measures should be thetarget variable? This is the question addressed in this paper.For this purpose I develop a small open economy model similar to the one usedby Gal and Monacelli (2004). In addition to the standard assumption of stickyprices, I also assume sticky wages indexed to past CPI ination. In each periodonly a fraction of workers is allowed to reoptimize while for the others I allowedfor a partial indexation to past CPI ination. This will be the main dierencewith the existing open economy literature. The main idea is that the volatilityof CPI and the impossibility for some workers to adjust their wages in orderto keep their mark up constant make the stabilization of CPI ination relevantin this context. In particular the assumptions on wages will produce two mainconsequences: rst, given the presence of wage rigidities, strict ination targetingwill no more be optimal (as Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) show in a closedeconomy setup); second, if at time t there is an exogenous increase in foreignprices such that CPI increases, this leads to an increase of nominal wages int + 1 (at least for workers that will not reoptimize, via the indexation channel)therefore, other things equals, marginal cost for rms will increase in t + 1 andso do prices. Therefore an increase of CPI ination in period t will induce anincrease in DI in period t+ 1. This link between CPI and DI makes it desirableto also stabilize CPI.As underlined by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) and by Smetsand Wouters (2002), there is strong empirical evidence of wage rigidities in theeconomy. Moreover Smets and Wouters (2002) estimate of the degree of wageindexation to past ination for the EURO area is around 0.65. Consequentlythere is empirical evidence in favour of the importance of modelling also wagerigidities and wage indexation.From a practical point of view there seems to be a unanimous consensusamong central banks on CPI being the correct target. In particular, as stressedby Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), starting from 1990 the following countries haveadopted an explicit target to CPI ination: Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel,New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK. In the EMU the European Central Bank'sobject is to stabilize the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HCPI) below2%.
2
In contrast, from a theoretical point of view, the answer to this question hasnot yet been established. There is a related open economy literature that hastried to address the question of which ination should be taken as target vari-able by the central bank. Clarida, Gal and Gertler (2001) analyse a small openeconomy model with price rigidities and frictions in the labour market and theynd that, as long as there is perfect exchange rate pass-through, the target of thecentral bank should be DI. They do not, however, model explicitly the frictions inthe labour market and they just assume an exogenous stochastic process for thewage mark-up. This is an important dierence with the model I developed be-cause assuming an exogenous process for the wage mark-up makes price stabilityno more optimal (like in my model) but omit the link that there might be be-tween domestic wages and foreign prices. A similar result is obtained in Gal andMonacelli (2004)1 where strict DI targeting turns out to be the optimal monetarypolicy, consequently outperforming a CPI targeting rule. In Clarida, Gal andGertler (2002) they present a two country model with sticky prices and they showthat in the case of no coordination the two monetary authorities should adjustthe interest rate in response to DI. On the other side Corsetti and Pesenti (2003)use a two country model with rm's prices set one period in advance to show that"inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when rms'markups are exposed to currency uctuations". This argument would becameless convincing in a currency area given that rms there would be less exposedto currency uctuations (only rms trading with countries outside the currencyarea would be aected by currency uctuations). In contrast, my results do notdepend on uctuations of the exchange rate and therefore can be extended tothe case of a currency area and are more suitable to explain the behaviour of theECB. Svensson (2000) uses a small open economy framework to analyse ina-tion targeting monetary policies and he underlines that "all ination-targetingcountries have chosen to target CPI ination...None of them has chosen to targetdomestic ination". Given this consideration he assumed an ad-hoc loss functionthat includes both CPI and DI in addition to other variables. The result of themodel (that is not fully microfounded) is that exible CPI ination targeting isbetter than exible DI targeting.The rst result of the paper is that from the Phillips Curve (computed bothfor wage ination and for DI) it is clear that there is a link between DI, CPIand wage ination. Given this link it is clearly dicult to stabilize DI withoutstabilizing also CPI and wage ination. In order to get a more precise analysisof what should a Central Bank do I derived the loss function as a second orderapproximation of the utility function and I compute the fully optimal monetarypolicy under commitment. Dierently from Gal and Monacelli (2004) I obtaina loss function that, in addition to output gap and home ination, depends alsoon CPI ination and wage ination. Given the presence of both price and wagerigidities, price stabilization is no more the optimal monetary policy. The object1Under the assumptions of log utility in consumption and unit elasticity of substitution amongforeign goods.
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of the paper is to use the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to comparedierent, implementable, monetary policy rules. In the choice of possible targetsfor monetary policy I disregard the output gap, that cannot be considered afeasible target since it is not clear how to estimate the natural level of output,and I concentrate on the other three variables that appear in the loss function.I focus on Taylor's type rules targeting two of the three variables. I simulate themodel under these monetary policy rules in order to make a ranking among them.I do this exercise for dierent degrees of wage indexation in order to analyse howthis feature of the model aects the results. In the case of no indexation aninward-looking monetary policy targeting DI and wage ination is, among thepolicy rules considered, the one performing better. But as soon as a positivedegree of indexation is introduced in the model this is no more true and thepolicy rule performing better is a Taylor rule targeting CPI ination and wageination. Increasing the level of indexation reinforces the results. Simulatingthe model under the optimal monetary policy rule and under the Taylor typerules and looking at the correlations among the series simulated in the dierentscenarios, it is clear that, at least for a positive degree of indexation, the Taylorrule targeting at CPI and wage ination delivers a behaviour of the economythat is very close to the one obtained under the optimal rule.These results therefore conrm the original hypothesis that the introductionof wage indexation would have aected the ranking among policy rules givingmore importance to the stabilization of CPI ination, i.e. making more desirablea monetary policy that is not completely inward-looking.The structure of the paper is the following: section 2 introduces the openeconomy model, section 3 presents the analysis of the loss function, section 4computes the optimal monetary policy under commitment, section 5 shows howdierent, implementable, monetary policy rules perform under dierent degreesof indexation and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Like in Gal and Monacelli (2004), there is a continuum [0; 1] of small, identical,countries. Dierently from the original model, I introduce the assumption ofmonopolistic competition on the supply side of labour market. I also assumethe presence of wage rigidities. It is worthy to note that one of the two basicassumptions of the model is that markets are complete, so that households dierin the amount of labour supplied (consequence of the presence of sticky wages)but share the same consumption. The second assumption is that the law of oneprice holds for individual goods at all times. From now on I will use "h" as indexfor a particular household, "i" to refer to a particular country and "j" as sectorindex. When no index is specied the variables refer to the home country.
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2.1 HouseholdsHousehold "h" maximizes:
E0 1X
t=0 t [U(Ct) + V (Nt(h))] (1)where Ct is an aggregate consumption index:
Ct  (1  ) 1C  1H;t +  1C  1F;t   1 (2)
where  represents the degree of openness, and CH;t and CF;t are two aggregateconsumption index, respectively for domestic and imported goods:
CH;t 
24 1Z0 CH;t(j)
p 1
p dj
35
p
p 1 (3)
CF;t 
24 1Z0 C
 1

i;t di
35

 1 (4)
Ci;t 
24 1Z0 Ci;t(j)
p 1
p dj
35
p
p 1 (5)
The parameter p > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between two vari-eties of goods, while the parameter  > 0 represents the elasticity of substitutionbetween home produced goods and goods produced abroad. Each household hmaximizes (1) under a sequence of budget constraints. The results regardingthe optimal allocation of expenditure across goods are not aected by the intro-duction of monopolistic competition in the labour market so, using the resultsof Gal and Monacelli (2004), I can directly write the budget constraint afterhaving aggregated over goods:
PtCt + Et [Qt;t+1Dt+1]  Dt + (1 + ﬁw)Wt(h)Nt(h) + Tt (6)where Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Dt is the payo in t of the portfolioheld in t 1, Tt is a lump-sum transfer (or tax), ﬁw is a subsidy to labour incomeand Pt is the aggregate price index:
Pt  h(1  )(PH;t)1  + (PF;t)1 i 11  (7)
PH;t  Z 10 PH;t(j)1 pdj
 11 p (8)
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PF;t  Z 10 P 1 i;t di
 11  (9)
Pi;t  Z 10 Pi;t(j)1 pdj
 11 p (10)
Each household supplies a dierentiated labour service in each sector, so thatthe total labour supplied by household h is given by Nt(h) = R 10 Nt;h(j)dj.Consequently, he will maximize (1) subject to the demand for labour. Giventhat the production function in each sector j is given by Yt(j) = AtNt(j) with
Nt(j) = R 10 Nt;j(h) w 1w dh ww 1 , the cost minimization problem of rms yieldsto the following demand for labour faced by individual h:
Nt(h) = Wt(h)Wt
 w Nt (11)
where w > 1 represents the elasticity of substitutions between workers and theaggregate wage index is given by Wt  hR 10 Wt(h)1 wdhi 11 w .
2.1.1 Wages decisionsIn each period only a fraction (1  w) of households can reset wages optimally.For the fraction w of households that cannot reset wages optimally I allow fora partial indexation to past CPI ination. Another way to think about it isthat in each period there is a fraction of workers that nd it easier, instead offully reoptimize, just to follow a simple rule (like assumed in Christiano et al.(2001) for rms) trying to preserve their real wages. That is why the indexationis to CPI and not to domestic ination. Like Smets and Wouters (2002), I haveintroduced the parameter w so that will be possible to study, later on, howcertain results may be aected by dierent degrees of indexation. Therefore thewage of the fraction w of households that can not reoptimize in t is given by:
Wt(h) = wt 1Wt 1(h) (12)where t is the CPI ination. Each household that can reoptimise in t will chooseWt(h) considering the hypothesis that he will not be able to reoptimise any morein the future. Consequently he will maximize (1) under (6) and (11) taking intoaccount the probability of not being allowed to reoptimise in the future. TheFOC of this optimisation problem is:
Et 1X
T=0(w)T
"UC [Ct+T ]Wt(h)wtTPt+T (1 + ﬁw)w   1w + VN [Nt+T (h)]
#Nt+T (h) = 0
(13)
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with tT = tt+1::::T 1 = Pt+T 1Pt 1 . From (13) it is clear that the solutionfWt(h) will be the same for all households that are allowed to reoptimise in t. Tosolve for the optimal wage we need rst to log linearize (13) around the steadystate:
Et 1X
T=0(w)T
hb	t+T   dMRSt+T (h)i = 0 (14)
where 	t+T = eWtwtTPt+T is the real wage,MRSt =  VN;tUC;t and b	t+T and dMRSt+T (h)are the log deviations from their levels with exible prices. Rearranging terms Iget the following equation for the optimal wage:
logfWt =  log(1 w)+(1 w)Et 1X
T=0(w)T [logMRSt+T (h) + logPt+T   w log tT ](15)where log(1  w) = log(1 + ﬁw)  log(w) and w = ww 1 is the wage markup.Whenever ﬁw = 1w 1 then w = 0 and the scal policy completely eliminatesthe distortion caused by the presence of monopolistic competition in the supplyof labour. When instead ﬁw < 1w 1 , then   log(1  w) > 0 and a distortion ispresent in the economy2. From now on I will assume the following specicationfor the utility function:
U(C) + V (N) = C1 ﬀ1  ﬀ   N1+'1 + ' (16)
Given this specication, and with some algebra, I get the following expression:
logfWt =
 
(1  w)1 + 'w
1X
T=0(w)TEt[bwt+T ] + log(Wt) +
+ 1X
T=1(w)TEt log wt+T +
 w(1  w) 1X
T=0(w)TEt log tT (17)
where bwt = log(Wt)   log(Pt)   log(MRSt) + log(1   w). The optimal wagetoday will be higher the higher the expectations about future wages. Future CPI2Note that if ww 1 = 1 + ﬁw the scal policy is able to completely eliminate the distortion arisingfrom labour markets. Following Woodford (2003) I'm dening 1   w = (1 + ﬁw) w 1w where wrepresents the distortion in the economy. Whenever w > 0 the level of employment in the exibleprice equilibrium will be lower than the one that we would have without distortions. When doingwelfare analysis I'll assume for simplicity w = 0 but now I can consider the more general case.
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ination has instead a negative impact because of indexation. In particular, thehigher the level of indexation and the higher the expected future CPI ination,the lower will be the optimal wage today. This is because agents know that even ifthey will not be allowed to reoptimise in the near future, their wages will increaseanyway because of indexation. This eect would disappear with  = 0. Note thatwith the labour subsidy in place the distortion in the labour market is lower thanthe one that we would have without subsidy, indeed   log(w) < log(1 w)  0.Still, bwt = 0 means that the wage charged is higher then the one that would becharged with perfect competition on the labour market. So, even if the monetaryauthority manages to eliminate the distortions arising from the nominal rigidities,the level of employment will be lower then the natural one, unless w = 0.The next step is to analyse the corresponding Phillips Curve on wage ination.Given that the fraction (1  w) of households that is allowed to reoptimise willchoose the same wage, while the others will follow the indexation rule, I canrewrite the aggregate wage index as:
Wt = h(1  w)fW 1 wt + w(Wt 1wt 1)1 wi 11 w (18)The log linearized version of this equation is given by:
logWt = (1  w) logfWt + w logWt 1 + ww log t 1 (19)It is useful to rewrite (17) in the following way:
logfWt   wEt logfWt+1 =  1  w1 + 'w bwt + (1  w) logWt (20)From now on all the lower case letters denote the log of the variables. Combining(20) with (19), I obtain:
wt =  wbwt + Et[wt+1]  wwt + wt 1 (21)where w = 1 ww 1 w1+'w . As in the case of no indexation, current wage inationdepends positively on the expected future wage ination and negatively on thedeviation of the markup from its frictionless level. In particular when bwt > 0the markup charged is higher then its optimal level, that's way wages respondnegatively to a positive bwt . This result is consistent with the one obtainedin Gal (2002) in the closed economy case with no indexation. The presenceof indexation introduces two new elements: a negative impact of current CPIination and a positive impact of past CPI ination. For what concern presentination, because of indexation households know that, even if they will not beable to change wages in the next period, their wages will increase because ofthe link with current ination, so there is no need to increase them today. Pastination, instead, has a positive impact on current wage ination because agentsthat are not allowed to reoptimize in t will see their wages increase because ofindexation.
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2.1.2 Consumption DecisionsMaximizing (1) with respect to consumption, under the constraints, leads to thestandard Euler Equation:
RtEt "Ct+1Ct
 ﬀ PtPt+1
# = 1 (22)
with Rt = 1Et[Qt;t+1] .
2.2 FirmsThe production function of an home rm in sector j is given by:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (23)with at  log(At) and
at+1 = aat + "A;t: (24)The aggregate domestic output is given by:
Yt = Z 10 Yt(j) p 1p dj
 pp 1 (25)
Up to a rst order approximation Gal and Monacelli (2004) demonstrate that:
yt = at + nt (26)In each period only a fraction (1  p) of rms can reset prices optimally.Given that the elasticity of substitution between varieties of nal goods isp > 1, the markup that each rm would like to charge is p = pp 1 . Assumingthe presence of a subsidy ﬁp to the rm's output, optimal price setting of a homerm j must satisfy the following FOC:
Et 1X
T=0 Tp Qt;t+TYt+T (j)
"(1 + ﬁp)p   1p PH;t(j) MCt+T
# = 0 (27)
where MCt represents the nominal marginal cost. Like for wages, it is useful todene 1 p  (1+ ﬁp) p 1p , where p indicates the distortion due to monopolypower on the rm side that is still present in the economy after the interventionof the scal authority. If the scal authority optimally choose ﬁp in order toexactly oset the monopoly distortion then p = 0. If w > 0 and/or p > 0then the exible price allocation will deliver an output and an employment levellower then the natural ones.From the log-linear approximation of (27) around the steady state it is possibleto derive the standard log-linear optimal price rule:
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epH;t =   log(1  p) + (1  p)Et 1X
T=0(p)T [mct+T + pH;t] (28)where epH;t represents the (log of) price chosen by the rms that are allowed toreoptimise in t, and mct represents the (log of) real marginal cost.
2.3 Equilibrium ConditionsTo close the model some relations between home and foreign variables are needed.A "star" will be used to denote world variables. The following equations3 arethe ones obtained by Gal and Monacelli (2004):
Ct = Y t (29)
ct = ct + 1  ﬀ st (30)where St  PF;tPH;t are the eective terms of trade and (30) represents the interna-tional risk sharing condition. The market clearing condition is given by:
Yt = CtSt (31)The world output is assumed to follow an exogenous law of motion:
yt+1 = yyt + "y;t: (32)The terms of trade can be expressed also in function of the aggregate and thehome price indexes:
st = pt   pH;t (33)The relation between the home output and the world output is given by:
st = ﬀ(yt   yt ) (34)with ﬀ  ﬀ1 +! > 0 and !  ﬀ + (1  )(ﬀ   1)
2.4 The New Keynesian Phillips CurveThe relation between domestic ination and real marginal cost is not aected bythe presence of sticky wages:
H;t = Et[H;t+1] + cmct (35)3All these relations, with the only exception of (29) that is an exact relation, hold exactly onlyunder the assumption that ﬀ =  = 1. Otherwise they hold up to a rst order approximation.
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with   (1 p)(1 p)p and with cmct, log deviation of the real marginal costfrom its level in absence of nominal rigidities (i.e. cmct = mct  mc with mc =log(1   p)). The presence of sticky wages leads to an additional term in thestandard equation relating the marginal cost with the output gap (the derivationis in the appendix):
cmct = (ﬀ + ')(yt   yt) + bwt (36)When wages are fully exible bwt = 0. When wages are sticky this is no moretrue and in particular, when bwt > 0, the markup charged by workers is higherthen the optimal one and rms bear a higher real marginal cost. Consequentlythe NKPC for a small open economy with both price and wage rigidities is:
H;t = Et[H;t+1] + (ﬀ + ')(yt   yt) + bwt (37)Even assuming that the only distortions left in the economy are the ones gen-erated by the presence of nominal rigidities, clearly as in Erceg et al. (2000),since it is not possible to stabilize at the same time the home ination, the wageination and the output gap, the exible price allocation is no longer a feasibletarget. Is it still true then, that a Taylor rule targeting the home ination isthe one that performs better? It can be interesting to analyse the impact of anincrease in pt on H;t. To keep the wage markup constant wages should increaseto oset the change in prices but, because of stickiness, this is not possible forall households, so some of them will charge a wage that is lower than the desiredone and bwt will become negative. This will have a negative impact on homeination. On the other hand, because of indexation to past ination, in t + 1the aggregate wage index will increase and so will do bwt+1. This will lead toan increase of EtH;t+1. So, other things equal, an increase in pt will for surecause an increase of H;t+1, whereas the impact on current home ination is notclear. Given this link between home ination, CPI ination and wage ination,it seems reasonable to postulate that targeting only one of these variables maynot be optimal because, if CPI and wage ination are very volatile, it will behard to stabilize only home ination.To prove this conjecture, in the next section, I will derive the welfare functionfrom a second order approximation of the utility of the representative household.I will then use the welfare function to study the behavior of the economy underoptimal monetary policy. Finally, using the results under optimal monetary pol-icy as benchmark, I will compare dierent welfare losses obtained using dierent,implementable, policy rules.
3 Welfare function
Before starting with the welfare analysis it is important to underline that inthe open economy model there are 5 distortions: monopolistic power in both
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goods and labour markets; nominal rigidities in both wages and prices; incen-tives to generate exchange rate appreciation. In a closed economy frameworkto require w = p = 0 is enough to ensure that the exible price allocationwill coincide with the optimal one, but this is no more true in an open economy.As emphasised by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), a monetary expansion has twoconsequences in this context: it increases the demand for domestically producedgoods and it deteriorates the terms of trade of domestic consumers. So in somecases the monetary authority may have the incentive to generate an exchangerate appreciation, even at the cost of a level of output (employment) lower thanthe optimal one. From now on I will assume ﬀ =  = 1 (i.e. log utility in con-sumption and unit elasticity of substitution between home produced goods andgoods produced abroad). In this case the equilibrium conditions derived in 2.3hold exactly and maximizing (1) under the production function Yt = AtNt, (31)and (30) leads to the following FOC:
 
UNUC = (1  )A1 N (Y ) (38)The solution is a constant, optimal, level of employment N = (1  ) 11+' . Let'snow analyse under which conditions the exible price equilibrium delivers theoptimal allocation. Under exible prices in every period bwt = cmct = 0 holds.Combining these two conditions and using some of the equilibrium conditions Iget:
N1+'t w1 + ﬁw = 1 + ﬁpp (39)Once having substituted for the optimal level of N , (39) tells how the two subsi-dies should be set in order to attain the optimal allocation in the exible pricesequilibrium. From now on I will assume that the subsidies are set such that theexible price equilibrium coincides with the Pareto optimum4.All households have the same level of consumption but dierent levels oflabour. For this reason, when computing the welfare function, we need to averagethe disutility of labour across agents:
Wt = U(Ct) + Z 10 V (Nt(h))dh (40)From now on all the variables of the type bat represent log deviations from thesteady state.The second order approximation of the welfare function leads to5:
Wt  W =(1  )byt + V NNEh[bnt(h) + 1 + '2 bn2t (h)] + o(kak3) (41)4In the simulation I set w = 0 and consequently, 1  p = 1  .5The derivations of the equations in this section are in appendix B.
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The approximation of the two expected values leads to:
Eh[bnt(h)] =byt   at + 12pV arf [byt(f)]  12 w   1w V arh[bnt(h)] + o(kak3) (42)
Eh[bn2t (h)] = V arh[bnt(h)] + [Eh[bnt(h)]]2 (43)Having chosen optimally ﬁp and ﬁw, the following holds  V NN = (1 ). Thenusing this relation and substituting (42) and (43) into (41) the second orderapproximation of the welfare function around the steady state become:
Wt  W =(1  )at   (1  )2p V arj [byt(j)]  (1  )(1 + 'w)2w V arh[bnt(h)] +
 
(1  )(1 + ')2 (byt   at)2 + o(kak3) (44)Computing the approximation around the steady state of the welfare function inabsence of nominal rigidities leads to6:
Wnt  W =(1  )at   (1  )(1 + ')2 (bynt   at)2 + o(kak3) (45)Consequently,
Wt  Wnt =
 
(1  )(1 + ')2 (by2t   (bynt )2) + (1  )(1 + ')(byt   bynt )at +
 
(1  )2p V arj [byt(j)]  (1  )(1 + 'w)2w V arh[bnt(h)] + o(kak3) (46)
Log-linearizing equation (38) I get at = bynt .Consequently, from (46) I get the following loss function:
W  1X
t=0 t(Wt  Wnt ) =
 
1  2 1Xt=0 t
"(1 + ')x2t + 1pV arj [byt(j)] + 1 + 'ww V arh [bnt(h)]
# (47)
6With exible prices and wages there are no dierences across workers and rms so V arf = V arh =0
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where xt = byt   bynt = yt   ynt . As proved by Woodford (2001),1X
t=0 
tpV arj [byt(j)] = p
1X
t=0 t2h;t (48)
It remains to study V arh[bnt(h)]. Let's rst write the log linear labour demandfaced by each household:
bnt(h) =  w log(Wt(h)) + w log(Wt) + bnt + o(kak2) (49)consequently:
V arh[bnt(h)] = 2wV arh[wt(h)] (50)with wt(h) = log(Wt(h)).Following the same procedure used in Woodford (2001) for the variance of pricesthe following holds:
1X
t=0 tV arh[ bwt(h)] = w(1  w)(1  w)
1X
t=0 t2w;t+
+2w w(1  w)(1  w)
1X
t=0 t2t + t:i:p:+ o(kak3) (51)Consequently,
1 + 'ww
1X
t=0 tV arh[bnt(h)] = ww
1X
t=0 t2w;t + 2w ww
1X
t=0 t2t (52)With the previous results I can rewrite the loss function:
W =  1  2 1Xt=0 t
(1 + ')x2t + p 2h;t + ww 2w;t + 2w ww 2t
 (53)
Taking unconditional expectation of (61) and letting  ! 1 the expected welfareloss is:
L =  1  2
(1 + ')V ar(xt) + p V ar(h;t) + wwV ar(w;t) + 2w wwV ar(t)

(54)From the comparison between this equation and the one obtained by Galand Monacelli (2004) it emerges that the loss function is aected by two extraterms: the variance of wage ination and the variance of CPI ination. It isinteresting to compare the coecients of the two price inations. Assuming thatp = w and that p = w, CPI ination has a higher weight than domesticination in the loss function whenever w > q 1(1+'w) . Clearly, the higherthe level of wage indexation, the more important it will be to stabilize CPI
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ination. Also, the higher ' and w (and p) the more likely it is that theprevious condition will be satised. So depending on the calibration of the modeland in particular depending on the level of wage indexation, it may be that theloss function is more sensible to variation in CPI ination than to variation inDI. Clearly this is not enough to say which variable to target. For this reason Irst analyse the behaviour of the economy under fully optimal monetary policywith commitment. Afterward, using the results with optimal monetary policy asa benchmark, I simulate the model under dierent, ad-hoc, policy rules, to makea ranking among them (section 5).
4 Optimal monetary policy with commitment
In this section, following Clarida, Gal and Gertler (1999) and Giannoni andWoodford (2002), I compute the fully optimal monetary policy under commit-ment.The rst step, in order to make optimal monetary policy easier to compute,is to reduce the original system of equations fully characterizing the model (seeappendix C) as much as possible. The system can be reduced to the followingequations:
(xt+ log(1  )1 + ' +at yt ) = (xt 1+ log(1  )1 + ' +at 1 yt 1)+t h;t (55)
w;t = wt + t   wt 1 (56)
w;t = Etw;t+1 w wt   yt + 'at   (1 + '  )(xt + log(1  )1 + ' + at)

 wwt+wt 1(57)
h;t = Eth;t+1+(1+')xt+ wt   yt + 'at   (1 + '  )(xt + log(1  )1 + ' + at)

(58)
yt+1 = yyt + "y;t: (59)
at+1 = aat + "A;t: (60)With the inclusion of a monetary policy rule, equations (55), (56), (57) and (58)dene the variables xt, h;t, w;t, t and wt, while the last two equations denethe low of motion of the two exogenous shocks.
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To compute the optimal monetary policy under commitment the central bankhas to choose fxt; h;t; w;t; t; wtg1t=0 in order to maximize7:
W =  1  2 1Xt=0 t
(1 + ')x2t + p 2h;t + ww 2w;t + 2w ww 2t
 (61)
subject to the sequence of constraints dened by equations (55), (56), (57) and(58).
Before presenting the rst order conditions it is interesting to note that ina closed economy contest Giannoni and Woodford (2002) compute the optimalmonetary policy in a model with sticky wages indexed to past ination and intheir case the model is fully characterized by equations (56), (57) and (58). Onthe other hand Gal and Monacelli (2004) have a small open economy withoutwage rigidities and to compute optimal monetary policy is enough to consider(58), therefore is not only the open economy aspect of this paper that makes (55)necessary. Actually is a combination of the open economy assumption plus thepresence of wages rigidity. Like in Gal and Monacelli (2004), the behavior of DI isdetermined by the Phillips Curve while CPI is determined by equation (90) thatlinks CPI with DI and the terms of trade. In Gal and Monacelli (2004) there is noneed to consider this equation while studying optimal monetary policy becausenor the welfare function neither the NKPC contain the CPI. Here instead, theCPI enters the NKPC on wage ination both throw the indexation channel andthrow the real wage and that's why I need to consider also equation (55) as aconstraint (even in the case of no indexation).The FOCs of this problem are (i;t is the lagrange multiplier associated tothe constraint i):
 xt :
 (1 )(1+')xt 1;t+1;t+1+4;t+w(1+' )3;t = 0 (62)
 h;t :
 (1  )p h;t   1;t   4;t +4;t 1 = 0 (63)
 w;t :
 (1  ) ww w;t   2;t   3;t +3;t 1 = 0 (64)
 t :
 (1  )2w ww t +1;t +2;t   ww3;t + w3;t+1 = 0 (65)7Giannoni and Woodford (2002) do the optimization including also the IS equation among theconstraints and maximizing also with respect to the interest rate. Following Clarida et al. (1999) I havedivided the problem in two steps. I rst maximize the welfare with respect to fxt; h;t; w;t; t; wtg1t=0without considering the IS. Then, once obtained the optimal responses of those variables to theexogenous shocks, I can use the IS in order to see how the interest rate has to be set under optimalmonetary policy.
16
 wt : 2;t   2;t+1   3;tw + 4;t = 0 (66)
Equations (62)-(66) plus the constraints (55)-(58) fully characterize the behaviourof the economy under optimal monetary policy. Using the Uhlig's toolkit8 I cansolve the system of equations and study the behavior of the variables under op-timal monetary policy. In the next section I consider several, implementable,policy rules and I analyse how well they perform using the optimal monetarypolicy as the benchmark case.
5 Evaluation of dierent policy rules
The original question was if, once wage rigidities are introduced in a small openeconomy, it is better to have a inward-looking monetary policy (like in Gal andMonacelli (2004)),or if it is preferable an outward-looking monetary policy. Toanswer this question I will compare the performance of several rules.
5.1 Implementable policy rulesThe welfare loss is function of , H , w and the output gap. In the choice ofpossible targets for monetary policy I disregard the output gap, that cannot beconsidered a feasible target since it is not clear how to estimate the natural levelof output. I therefore concentrate on the other three variables. I consider Taylortype rules targeting two of the three variables, i.e. I consider the following rules:
rt = + ﬃpt + ﬃp;HH;t (67)rt = + ﬃpt + ﬃww;t (68)rt = + ﬃp;HH;t + ﬃww;t (69)Instead of imposing a priori given coecients for ﬃp, ﬃp;H and ﬃw I chosethe values minimizing the welfare loss for a given grid of parameters9. I didthis exercise for dierent degrees of wage indexation in order to analyse howthis feature of the model aects the results. The zero indexation case is thebenchmark.
5.2 Calibration of the parametersMost of the parameters have been calibrated like in Erceg et al. (2000). Theaverage contract duration is one quarter, i.e. p = w = 0:75. The elasticityof substitution between workers and between goods are p = w = 4. Thediscount factor is  = 0:99. The productivity shock follows an AR(1) processwith a = 0:95. The exogenous shock to productivity is an i.i.d with mean8To simulate the model I used the Matlab program developed by Harald Uhlig. See Uhlig (1995).9I used a grid from 1 to 5 with intervals of 0.25 for both the parameters in the Taylor rule.
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zero and standard deviation ﬀa = 0:0071. The parameters related to the openeconomy part are calibrated following Gal and Monacelli (2004):  = 0:4 andthe world output follows an AR(1) process with y = 0:86. The exogenous shockto world output is i.i.d with zero mean and with standard deviation ﬀy = 0:0078.The correlation between the two exogenous shocks is corra;y = 0:3. Since theloss function has been derived under the assumption ﬀ =  = 1 I keep thisassumption in the simulation. Finally ' = 3, i.e. the labour supply elasticity isset equal to 13 . For what concern the level of wage indexation I simulated themodel under dierent parameter values for w in order to be able to evaluate theimpact of dierent degrees of indexation on the results.
5.3 Performance of dierent monetary policy rulesThe purpose of this section is twofold: rst, I want to make a ranking amongthe ad-hoc policy rules dened before in order to nd the one performing better;second, I want to quantitatively evaluate how close they are to the optimal mon-etary policy. To this end, the rst step is to simulate the model under dierentpolicy rules and to compute the welfare losses associated to each of them. Thisallows me to make a ranking among the policy rules. Clearly, in general, tworules could deliver exactly the same loss and, nonetheless, be dierent, i.e. theycould generate very dierent impulse responses to the exogenous shocks. There-fore, to have more conclusive results, I study not only the losses associated todierent policy rules, but also the standard deviations of the variable of interestand the correlations between the simulated series obtained under optimal mon-etary policy and the ones obtained under the dierent Taylor rules. This lastmeasure is particularly interesting because the more the correlation is close toone, the more I can "safely" say that the rule is close to the optimal one.In table 1 are reported the welfare losses associated both to the optimalpolicy rule and to the Taylor rules. With no indexation the rule performing best(among the Taylor type rules) is the one targeting both DI and wage ination.The loss associated to this rule is very close to the one obtained under optimalmonetary policy. Anyway, the Taylor targeting at CPI and wage ination deliversa loss only slightly bigger while the Taylor targeting at CPI and DI deliversa loss that is roughly 6:6 times bigger than the one observed under optimalmonetary policy. Therefore, only looking at the welfare losses, when there isno indexation, the inward-looking monetary policy (i.e. the one targeting at DIand wage ination) seems to perform slightly better than the outward-lookingone (i.e. the one targeting at CPI and wage ination). But as soon as a positivedegree of indexation is introduced this result drastically changes because the ruleperforming better is the one targeting CPI and wage ination. In particular, itcan be observed that even with high degrees of wage indexation, the loss deliveredby this rule is always around 1:2 times the one obtained with the optimal rule,whereas when targeting DI and wage ination the loss can be even 3:8 timesthe one obtained under optimal monetary policy. Therefore this rst analysissupport the original intuition that the introduction of wage indexation makes it
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desirable for monetary policy to move from an inward-looking monetary policyto a rule targeting the CPI ination. The second step is to understand how muchthis rule is close to the optimal one.In table 2 are reported the standard deviations of output gap, DI, CPI andwage ination under dierent rules, for dierent degrees of wage indexation. Theoriginal intuition that, given the link between CPI ination and wage inationtrough the indexation mechanism, it would have been dicult to stabilize DIination without stabilizing CPI, is conrmed by the analysis of the standarddeviations. Indeed, when the monetary authority uses the Taylor rule target-ing CPI and wage ination, the standard deviation of DI is lower than whenthe target variables are DI and wage ination. Also, the standard deviation ofwage ination is always lower when the target variable is CPI than when is DI.Therefore, from the analysis of table 2, it can be concluded that the Taylor ruletargeting at CPI and wage ination delivers a welfare loss lower than the onesobtained with the other two rules because it reduces the overall variance of themain variables.The analysis of the variances is useful in understanding where the losses comefrom. Still, it could be the case that two rules deliver exactly the same variancesbut generate very dierent responses to the exogenous shocks. Therefore thelast step is the study of the correlations among the series simulated using thefully optimal monetary policy rule and the ones simulated using the Taylor rules.When there is no wage indexation none of the three Taylor rules seems to delivera behaviour of the economy close to the one observed under the fully optimalmonetary policy, indeed the correlations computed for the series of output gap,CPI, DI and wage ination are between 0.16 and 0.28. While the analysis of thewelfare loss and of the standard deviations does not really allow to discriminatebetween the inward-looking and the outward-looking Taylor rule, looking at thecorrelations it is clear the the inward-looking Taylor rule is the closest to theoptimal rule, even if the correlations are quite small. Things change drasticallyas soon as a positive degree of wage indexation is introduced. Indeed now usingthe Taylor rule with CPI and wage ination, the correlations of CPI, DI andoutput gap are between 0.95 and 0.98. The wage ination series seem insteadto be uncorrelated under this rule. For higher levels of wage indexation instead,the correlation computed for wage ination is around 0.80 and there is no doubtthat under the outward-looking Taylor rule, the reaction of the variables to theexogenous shocks is very close to what it would be observed under the fullyoptimal monetary policy rule with commitment.
6 Conclusions
The starting point of this paper was to analyse wether the introduction of wagerigidities in a small open economy model was enough to justify why a centralbank should care not only about domestic ination but also about CPI ina-tion. As in the closed economy case, once both kinds of nominal rigidities are
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present, it is no more possible to reach the exible price allocation because itis not possible to stabilize at the same time price ination, wage ination andthe output gap. Given this, an interesting question was if it were still true thattargeting home ination is the best that a central bank can do and, if not, howthe new results are aected by the presence of wage indexation. To this purposeI derived the loss function from a second order approximation of the welfarefunction. Compared with the one obtained by Gal and Monacelli (2004), thepresence of sticky wages makes the loss function depending also on V ar[w;t]while the presence of indexation introduces, in addition to V ar[H;t], also thevolatility of CPI, V ar[t]. Then, I used the loss function to derive the opti-mal monetary policy with commitment.The next step has been to simulate themodel under dierent, implementable, monetary policy rules, in order to make aranking among them, using the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark. Withzero indexation a Taylor type rule targeting wage ination and DI is the ruleperforming best among the one considered. Still, computing the correlationsamong the simulated series of the main variables under this rule and under theoptimal monetary policy, it is clear that the inward-looking Taylor rule can notbe considered as a good approximation of the optimal rule since the correlationcoecients are below 0.30. When I allow for a positive degree of indexation therule performing better is the Taylor targeting at CPI and wage ination. In thiscase not only the volatility of the variables are very close to the ones obtainedunder the optimal rules, but also the correlations coecients are very high (big-ger than 0.95 in many cases). Therefore, going back to the question of the title,these results conrm the opportunity of targeting at CPI instead of DI.
A Derivation of dmct
Making use of some of the equilibrium conditions dened in (2.3), the realmarginal cost can be written as:
mct = wt   pH;t   at= mrst + log(wt ) + pt   pH;t   at= ﬀ  yt + (1  )st + '(yt   at) +   st   at + log(wt )= (ﬀ   ﬀ)yt + (ﬀ + ')yt   (1 + ')at + log(wt ) (70)
where wt represents the actual markup charged in each period10. From equation(70) we can express the level of output as:
yt = mctﬀ + '   ﬀ   ﬀﬀ + 'yt + 1 + 'ﬀ + 'at   log(wt )ﬀ + ' (71)10Note that with the presence of taxes that exactly oset the monopoly distortions, the wedgebetween the real wage and the mrst is do only to the presence of stickiness, whereas when w > 0then wt reects both the presence of stickiness and the presence of monopoly power.
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Let's dene yt the natural level of output, i.e. the level of output in absence ofnominal rigidities:
yt = mcﬀ + '   ﬀ   ﬀﬀ + 'yt + 1 + 'ﬀ + 'at + log(1  w)ﬀ + ' (72)Then,
yt   yt = cmctﬀ + '   bwtﬀ + ' (73)that is exactly equation (36).
B Derivation of the loss function
B.1 Derivation of Wt  WAll the results in this section are derived under the assumption ﬀ =  = 1. Underthis assumption the relations dened in (2.3) hold exactly and I can derive asecond order approximation of the utility function using rst order approximationof the structural equations. I will substitute the following expression of the secondorder derivative: VNN = '  VNN 1. I will also use the fact that:
Xt  XX = bxt + 12 bx2t + o(kak3) (74)
Up to a second order approximation it is true that:
U(Ct) =+U(C) + UC(Ct   C) + 12UCC(Ct   C)2 + o(kak3) (75)Using (74) and the relations between consumption and output dened in (2.3)theprevious equation becomes:
U(Ct)  U(C) = bct + o(kak3)= (1  )byt + o(kak3) (76)
In an analogous way it's true that:
EhV (Nt(h)) =V (N) + Eh[V N (Nt  N)] + 12Eh[V NN (Nt  N)2] + o(kak3) (77)that using (74) and the relation between rst order and second order derivativesleads to:
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Eh[V (Nt(h); Zt)] =V (N; 0) + V NNEh bnt(h) + 1 + '2 bn2t (h)
+ o(kak3) (78)
Combining (76) and (78) I get equation (41).
B.2 Derivation of Eh[bnt(h)]
Since in general for A = hR 10 A(i)ﬃdii 1ﬃ it's true that11 bat = Ei[ba(i)] + 12ﬃ V ari[ba(i)] + o(kak3), then given the way in which aggregate labour has beendened, I can write:
bnt = Eh[bnt(h)] + 12 w   1w V arh[bnt(h)] + o(kak3) (79)Following Erceg et al. (2000), it is useful to write bnt in function of the aggregatedemand of labour by rms Nt = R 10 Nt(f)df :
bnt = Ef [bnt(f)] + 12V arf [bnt(f)] + o(kak3) (80)Clearly, since byt(f) = at+bnt(f), then V arf [bnt(f)] = V arf [byt(f)] and Ef [bnt(f)] =Ef [byt(f)]   at. Also, given the expression for aggregate output, Ef [byt(f)] =byt   12 p 1p V arf [byt(f)] + o(kak3), so I can write:
Eh[bnt(h)] = bnt   12 w   1w V arh[bnt(h)] + o(kak3)= Ef [byt(f)]  at + 12V arf [byt(f)]  12 w   1w V arh[bnt(h)] + o(kak3)= byt   at + 12pV arf [byt(f)]  12 w   1w V arh[bnt(h)] + o(kak3) (81)
B.3 Derivation of V arh[wt(h)]First it is useful to decompose the variance as12:
V arh[wt(h)] = Eh[wt(h)  Ehwt(h)]2= wEh[wt 1(h) + wt 1   Ehwt(h)]2+(1  w)[ ewt   Ehwt(h)] (82)11The reference for the results in this section is Erceg et al. (2000).12In general, if X assumes value X1 with probability  and X2 with probability (1   ), then
E(X2) =  X21 + (1  )X22 , but the fraction of workers that can not reoptimise in t will all have adierent wage, that's why, like in Erceg et al. (2000), I need to take expectations again.
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Using the log-linearized expression for the aggregate wage and the result by Erceget al. (2000) that wt   Ehwt(h) = o(kak2) then,
Eh[wt 1(h) + wt 1   Ehwt(h)]2 = Eh[wt 1(h) + wt 1   wEhwt 1(h)  wwt 1 +
 (1  w) ewt]2= Eh[wt 1(h) + wt 1   wt + o(kak2)]2= Eh[wt 1(h)  Ehwt 1(h) + wt 1   w;t + o(kak2)]2= V arhwt 1 + 2w;t + 2w2t 1 + o(kak3) (83)
With the same arguments I have:
[ ewt   Ehwt(h)]2 = [ ewt   wt]2 + o(kak3)
=  w1  w w;t   w1  w wt 1
2 + o(kak3) (84)
Substituting (83) and (84) into (82) I can write:
V arh[wt(h)] = wV arhwt 1(h) + w1  w 2w;t + w1  w 2w2t 1 (85)Like in Woodford (2001), let's dene 4wt = V arh[wt(h)]. Consequently I canrewrite (85) as:
4wt = w4wt 1 + w1  w 2w;t + w1  w 2w2t 1 + o(kak3) (86)Iterating backward the previous equation can be written has:
4wt = t+1w 4w 1 + tX
s=0 sw w1  w 2w;t s + 2w
tX
s=0 sw w1  w 2t 1 s + o(kak3) (87)
Following Woodford (2001):
1X
t=0 t4wt = w(1  w)(1  w)
1X
t=0 t2w;t+2w w(1  w)(1  w)
1X
t=0 t2t 1+t:i:p:+o(kak3)(88)Now it's enough to note that we can rewrite the last sum as:
2w w(1  w)(1  w)2 1 + 2w w(1  w)(1  w)
1X
t=0 t2t (89)and 2 1 is a t:i:p: like it was 4w 1. With this consideration equation (88) becameequation (51) in the text.
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C System of equations fully characterizing
the model
With the inclusion of a monetary policy rule the following system of equationsfully characterize the model:
st = st 1 + t   h;t (90)
yt = ct + st (91)
ynt = log(1  )1 + ' + at (92)
yt = at + nt (93)
w;t = wt + t   wt 1 (94)wt = log(Wt=Pt)
st = yt   yt (95)
xt = yt   yt (96)
ct =   [rt     Ett+1] + Etct+1 (97)
w;t = Etw;t+1   w [wt   ct   'nt]  wwt + wt 1 (98)
h;t = Eth;t+1 + (1 + ')xt +  [wt   ct   'nt] (99)
yt+1 = yyt + "y;t: (100)
at+1 = aat + "A;t: (101)
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Table 1: Welfare losses under optimal MP and under alternative Taylor's
type rules.Welfare losses are in percentage units of steady state consumption. For the
Taylor's rules are also reported the coecients of the policy rule minimizing the welfare
losses. Moments have been computed as average over 20 simulations, each 100 periods
long.
w Optimal MP Taylorﬃp;H   ﬃw Taylorﬃp   ﬃw Taylorﬃp   ﬃp;H0 0.0079 ﬃp;H = 2:25;ﬃw = 5
0.0089
ﬃp = 1:25;ﬃw = 4:750.0095 ﬃp = 1:25;ﬃp;H = 1:250.0529
0.25 0.0151 ﬃp;H = 1:25;ﬃw = 50.0254 ﬃp = 1:25;ﬃw = 50.0169 ﬃp = 4;ﬃp;H = 1:250.0594
0.45 0.0226 ﬃp;H = 1:25;ﬃw = 50.0614 ﬃp = 4:25;ﬃw = 3:50.0278 ﬃp = 4:5;ﬃp;H = 1:250.0608
0.65 0.0259 ﬃp;H = 1:25;ﬃw = 3:50.1006 ﬃp = 4:25;ﬃw = 3:750.0302 ﬃp = 4:5;ﬃp;H = 1:250.0664
Table 2: Standard deviations of several variables under the Optimal Mone-
tary Policy Rule and under several Taylor's type rules.(%) Standard deviations
have been computed as average over 20 simulations, each 100 periods long.
w Rule ﬀ() ﬀ(h) ﬀ(w) ﬀ(x)
0
Optimal
h   w
   w
   h
0.32890.3741
0.23510.3611
0.2076
0.19030.22420.2174
0.02900.0383
0.02250.1348
0.1741
0.31120.35801.0501
0.25
Optimal
h   w
   w
   h
0.16260.2595
0.16900.1204
0.21090.2067
0.20610.1383
0.02920.0654
0.03930.1423
0.5995
0.57380.64161.2363
0.45
Optimal
h   w
   w
   h
0.11510.2661
0.08450.0989
0.21650.20020.2030
0.1405
0.03840.1077
0.06550.1424
0.8428
0.85060.98181.2092
0.65
Optimal
h   w
   w
   h
0.08120.2407
0.07870.0949
0.19310.19040.1896
0.1342
0.04700.1462
0.06140.1475
0.9832
1.00861.06191.2028
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Table 3: Correlations among the simulated series obtained under the Fully
Optimal Monetary Policy Rule and the ones obtained under several Taylor's
type rules.
w Rule () (x) (w) (h)
0 h   w   w
   h
0.25590.1794-0.0862
0.1671-0.4031-0.0887
0.13880.1242
0.2209
0.28290.2231-0.0582
0.25 h   w   w
   h
0.9268
0.95710.0505
0.8414
0.95730.9202
0.0608-0.0550
0.6105
0.9797
0.98520.9006
0.45 h   w   w
   h
0.8675
0.89490.0247
0.9353
0.97300.9620
0.1506
0.80670.6705
0.9699
0.98920.9129
0.65 h   w   w
   h
0.7756
0.90860.0176
0.9424
0.98070.9721
0.1056
0.80640.6846
0.9295
0.98760.8860
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